

ONLINE NSC RELEASE

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/02/03 :
LOC-HAK-486-10-17-3

General Haig

The attached came in a sealed Eyes Only
envelope for you.

nancy

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Somerfeldt?
Smith

State Dept. review completed page 3

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/02/03 :
LOC-HAK-486-10-17-3

Done
7/13

BY WIRE

25X1

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

July 13, 1971

TO: Ambassador Gerard Smith, SALT, Helsinki
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
REF: SALT/Helsinki 0108

Thank you for referenced message. I have no objection
to your putting it into normal channels.

Warm regards.

MORI/CDF
C05138064
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HAK:AMH:JTH:lds:7/13/71

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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ZNY MMNSH

O 131812Z ZYH

FM SALT HELSINKI

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

ZEM

T O P S E C R E T 131730Z

FM AMB SMITH SALT HELSINKI 0108

TO WHITE HOUSE (PLEASE PASS MESSAGE TO SAN CLEMENTE)

EYES ONLY DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

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25X1

DEAR HENRY:

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IN JULY 13TH POST PLENARY, PURSUANT TO WHITE HOUSE INSTRUCTIONS, I SAID TO SEMENOV THAT I UNDERSTOOD SOME SOVIET OFFICIALS FELT THE US HAD NOT BEEN SERIOUS IN PROPOSING AN ABM BAN, BUT HAD PUT IT FORWARD FOR PROPAGANDA. I WAS AUTHORIZED TO SAY THAT THE BAN IS A SERIOUS PROPOSAL. I WAS INSTRUCTED TO SOUND OUT SEMENOV AS TO WHETHER THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WAS INTERESTED IN PURSUING IT. I HAD NOT FORMALLY TABLED A BAN BECAUSE I WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE OFFICIAL SOVIET POSITION.

SEMENOV ASKED WHETHER HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS CORRECT THAT THE US WOULD BE PREPARED TO SET FORTH ITS VIEWS ON THIS ALTERNATIVE IN DETAIL IF THE SOVIET SIDE SHOWED INTEREST IN THE MATTER. HE ALSO ASKED WHETHER HIS UNDERSTANDING WAS CORRECT THAT ELABORATION OF US VIEWS COULD TAKE PLACE IN A LESS FORMAL MANNER THAN IN PLENARY.

I SAID THAT, ON THE SUBSTANCE, I WOULD LIMIT MYSELF AT THE PRESENT TIME TO WHAT I HAD ALREADY SAID. AS FAR AS PROCEDURE WAS CONCERNED, IF THE TWO SIDES WERE TO PURSUE THIS QUESTION, I WOULD BE WILLING TO DO SO EITHER IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH SEMENOV OR IN A MEETING MORE RESTRICTED THAN A PLENARY. FOR THE MOMENT, HOWEVER, MY INSTRUCTIONS WERE MERELY TO SOUND OUT SEMENOV AND TO LEARN WHETHER THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD BE INTERESTED.

SEMENOV SAID "FRANKLY" HE HAD BROUGHT INSTRUCTIONS FOR THIS EVENTUALITY, TO THE FOLLOWING EFFECT--HE WAS TO LISTEN CAREFULLY TO US CONSIDERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THIS QUESTION TO DETERMINE THEIR SUBSTANCE AND REAL SIGNIFICANCE. HE DID NOT HAVE TO ASK FOR ADDITIONAL REACTIONS FROM MOSCOW BEFORE RESPONDING TO MY QUESTION. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT HE HAD ASKED WHAT PROCEDURE I HAD IN MIND FOR SETTING FORTH THE US VIEWS WHICH I EVIDENTLY PLANNED TO EXPRESS.

SEMENOV SAID THAT THE TWO SIDES WERE NOW COMING CLOSE TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE QUESTION OF LIMITING ABMS. IT WOULD BE WISE TO CONSIDER WHAT THE TWO SIDES HAD TO SAY WITHOUT PREJUDICE. THE SOVIET SIDE WOULD BE INTERESTED TO HEAR US VIEWS IN THIS CONNECTION. SEMENOV WOULD REPORT MY APPROACH TO HIS CAPITAL AND HE COULD TELL ME NOW THAT HE WOULD WISH TO HEAR US VIEWS IN AS MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE. I SAID I WOULD ALSO REPORT THIS CONVERSATION TO WASHINGTON AND WOULD LATER BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO DETERMINE HOW TO PROCEED.

I HAVE NOT YET REPORTED THIS IN NORMAL CHANNELS, BUT PROPOSE TO DO SO BY JULY 15TH UNLESS YOU ADVISE TO THE CONTRARY.

I PROPOSE TO PREPARE A TALKING PAPER OUTLINING THE CASE FOR A BAN, WHICH I WILL FORWARD BEFORE USING.

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR HELP IN GETTING OUR POSITION SQUARED AWAY FOR TODAY'S SESSION, WHICH WENT WELL.

WARM REGARDS.